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Abstract
Public health and private providers and facilities may shape the future of the US health system by 
engaging in new ways to deliver care to patients.
“Accountable care” contracts allow private health care and public health providers and facilities to 
collaboratively serve defined populations. Accountable care frameworks emphasize health care 
quality and cost savings, among other goals.
In this article, I explore the legal context for accountable care, including the mechanisms by which 
providers, facilities, and public health coordinate activities, avoid inefficiencies, and improve 
health outcomes. I highlight ongoing evaluations of the impact of accountable care on public 
health outcomes.
As the US Health System undergoes transformation, public health departments are engaging 
in new ways to deliver health care with private entities. One such method is “accountable 
care,” the coordinated provision of patient services by health care and public health 
providers and facilities with the goals of improving outcomes and avoiding inefficiencies.1 
The core tenets of accountable care are prevention, health care quality, patient satisfaction 
for the population served, and cost savings to the health care system.1 Accountable care 
frameworks are based on risk and reward, with providers and facilities agreeing to 
collectively share the financial risk for a population in return for the opportunity to access 
rewards for attaining pre-established health care goals.
Entities that seek to engage in accountable care are formed according to legal principles 
governing businesses and contracts, but federal and state laws2 specifically incentivize the 
formation and success of these entities by establishing antitrust waivers, fraud and abuse 
protections, and mandates to coordinate care. Although much has been written on the legal 
basis for establishing accountable care entities, with this article, I seek to inform public 
health practitioners of the relationship between the laws that recognize accountable care 
principles and the public health goals of improving patient care, impacting quality and 
outcomes, and measuring population health.
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In this article, I discuss 3 mechanisms by which providers, facilities, and public health may 
contract together to maintain legal entities that implement accountable care principles. First, 
health care providers and payers have pursued private contracts to provide accountable care 
to improve outcomes in their patient populations.3 Second, the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services authorizes Medicare reimbursements for legal entities certified as 
accountable care organizations (ACOs) through traditional fee-for-service and other 
payments upon meeting benchmark cost and quality standards.4 Third, state laws incorporate 
accountable care mechanisms into Medicaid provisions, permitting state programs to 
reimburse accountable care entities that serve vulnerable populations.5 Finally, I offer 
suggestions for evaluating the impacts of accountable care on public health outcomes.
PRIVATE ACCOUNTABLE CARE ENTITIES
Private payers and providers have led the shift toward accountable care frameworks for more 
than a decade, developing health care quality metrics that public health departments use to 
track population health today. Providers embraced the concepts of “care coordination” and 
“integrated networks of care,” championing patient-centered medical homes for primary 
care and participating in the 2005 Medicare Health Care Quality and Physician Group 
Practice demonstrations.6 Acceptance of these concepts allowed some providers and 
facilities to incorporate holistic patient care principles into existing contracts and 
employment relationships.6
Other health care entities developed new contracts and legal relationships to experiment with 
accountable care concepts: large multispecialty medical group practices contracted with 
health plans, and physicians jointly owned integrated delivery systems, sometimes with 
insurers.3 Advancements in defining health care quality metrics and improving health 
information technology, and cultural shifts toward accountability and transparency, aided 
these innovations.3 Although the new practices supported goals of patient outcomes and 
satisfaction, the emphasis remained on lowering health care costs for their populations 
served.7
A 2006 Massachusetts law promoting health system transformation through lowering health 
care costs further incentivized private sector innovations that espoused accountable care 
principles.8 For example, the insurer Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts provided 
up-front funding, known as “global budgets,” to 8 private medical groups, based on 
historical per-member-per-year spending, through its Alternative Quality Contract Program, 
and additional financial incentives to improve the quality and cost of services for its 
members.9 Although the funded providers contracted with existing health management 
organizations instead of creating new co-owned networks, the initial outcomes of the 
program showed lowered cost and improved quality for eligible populations through 
providing holistic patient care.10 Although they are not based strictly on population health 
measures, these successes nevertheless set the stage for developing an accountable care 
framework with quality and cost metrics at the federal level.
Anticipating federal incentives for ACOs, the private Premier Health Care Alliance launched 
the Accountable Care Implementation Collaborative in May 2010 to “develop the key 
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capabilities needed to operate an ACO based on a common model and consistent measures 
of success.”7(p42) Although this demonstration relied on member hospitals’, health systems’, 
and physician practice’s up-front contributions of $150 000, the capabilities still included 
patient-centered medical homes, population health data management, and patient 
satisfaction.7 Unlike ACOs authorized by federal law, discussed in the next section, the 
Collaborative does not function as a single, co-owned legal entity, but its members are still 
accountable for cost and quality measures according to their contracts.7 Without further data, 
it remains to be seen whether the measures Premier developed will help private or public 
health entities to evaluate the effectiveness and impact of accountable care on population 
health.
MEDICARE ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS
In contrast to the variability of the private entities described previously, federal law provides 
a uniform set of standards for ACOs that will serve Medicare populations and potentially 
incorporate public health entities and measures. Section 3022 of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 established the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP), 
which authorizes reimbursements to ACOs certified under the Medicare program.11 Under 
the resulting final rule, ACOs are defined as new legal entities recognized and incorporated 
under applicable state, federal, or tribal law and authorized to conduct business in every state 
of operation. In addition, an ACO must be formed by 1 or more service providers and 
suppliers, potentially including rural health clinics and federally qualified health centers, that 
work together to manage and coordinate care for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries.12 
No restrictions are placed on the distribution of rewards and penalties among the 
participants, which may present opportunities and challenges for the successful formation 
and management of the ACO. A fully functioning ACO under the MSSP is capable of 
receiving and distributing shared savings, repaying losses, and establishing, reporting, and 
ensuring providers’ compliance with quality standards.13
To receive federal reimbursements for providing care under Medicare, ACOs must meet 
stringent requirements. The ACOs must enter into a 3-year agreement to participate in the 
MSSP with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, have a formal legal structure 
supporting shared payments according to the terms of provider and supplier contracts with 
the ACO, and have a leadership and management structure that includes clinical and 
administrative systems.14 Accountable care organizations are approved by the MSSP if they 
become accountable for the quality, cost, and overall care of the assigned population, include 
enough primary care ACO professionals to serve a minimum of 5000 beneficiaries, provide 
information on participating professionals, define processes for and report on care, and 
demonstrate that they meet patient-centeredness criteria.14 The ACOs must enter into a data 
use agreement with the MSSP and comply with limitations on use and disclosure of 
identifiable health information required by the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 and other statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements.15
To encourage providers to participate in the MSSP, 2 “tracks” of ACOs were authorized for 
reimbursement with different levels of risk and savings. The first track allows the ACO to 
share up to 50% of its savings with Medicare once it spends less than a defined benchmark, 
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set at the level of the population’s use of primary care services at the end of each previous 
year.16 The second track requires the ACO to assume risk, allowing it to share in a greater 
portion of any savings, but also to share in any losses incurred if it fails to meet its 
benchmark.16 A third payment model provides ACOs that serve primarily rural or Medicaid 
populations, characterized by low annual revenues and with limited inpatient facilities, 
access to capital up-front like a global budget, but requires repayment of costs that are not 
recouped.17 The specific amount of shared savings that these ACOs will receive depends on 
whether providers meet quality performance standards, creating an incentive for the ACO to 
improve the quality of care for the population covered.18 At the time of this writing, Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services has not posted evaluation results that describe initial 
effects on population health outcomes or cost by MSSP accountable care organizations.
A separate category of ACOs authorized by federal law are pediatric ACOs, which are 
largely demonstration projects authorized under section 2706 of the Affordable Care Act. 
Pediatric ACOs are distinct from the MSSP accountable care organizations and operate 
under Medicaid or the Children’s Health Insurance Program.4 Because reaching these 
populations requires state action, pediatric ACOs are discussed in the Medicaid and 
Accountable Care section.
MEDICAID AND ACCOUNTABLE CARE
Since 2010, state laws have applied accountable care principles to Medicaid programs in an 
effort to align incentives and improve costs in parallel with the Medicare reforms detailed in 
federal law. Although the dominant model for payment continues to be managed care 
through either risk-based managed care organizations or fee-for-service primary care case 
management programs, states are incorporating accountable care strategies and patient-
centered medical homes into Medicaid programs to improve quality, effectiveness, cost 
containment, and health outcomes.5 For example, capitated managed care plans can 
encourage efficiency to keep savings and reduce risk through disease management and care 
coordination, and primary care case management can incentivize decreased utilization 
among providers paid through fee-for-service payments and per-member-per-month fees 
through addressing mental health or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.6 Many of the 
new strategies are demonstration projects that must be approved or “waived” by Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services under section 1115A of the Social Security Act, which 
establishes the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation to test methodologies for 
service delivery and payment for Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program.19
There are tremendous variations in state accountable care strategies, likely reflecting
individual states’ history and experience with managed care, other existing delivery 
arrangements within Medicaid, and the challenges inherent in serving low-income 
and chronically ill populations.19
For example, Medicaid accountable care entities may be regulated as insurers alongside 
managed care organizations, such as in Mississippi and New Hampshire.6 They could exist 
within capitated managed care plans as a single health care provider, as “enhanced medical 
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homes” in a collaborative demonstration project in Colorado, and as recognized providers in 
Montana, New York, Texas, and Utah.20 Blending these strategies, Medicaid programs also 
recognize accountable care entities as subcontractors that participate in shared savings with 
other health care entities, as in Washington’s pilot program for providers and networks with 
patient-centered medical homes.21 Finally, pediatric ACOs may be approved under Medicaid 
or the Children’s Health Insurance Program as 5-year demonstration projects, although 
states have great discretion to determine their scope and specific measures for success.22
The focus on improving population health through accountable care also differs between 
state laws. Some states require public health agencies or practitioners to participate in 
Medicaid accountable care entities to emphasize population health measures, including 
mental health and substance abuse services in Illinois; behavioral health, dental, pharmacy, 
and other services in New Jersey; and chronic conditions, mental illness or chemical 
dependency; and preventive, remedial, and supportive care and services in Oregon.23 Other 
states do not mention health outcomes, and instead focus entirely on cost outcomes and 
quality measurements, such as patient experience data in Washington.24 Most commonly, 
state laws specify types of health conditions or problems that accountable care entities must 
help address, but do not dictate the public health partners who must be involved or the 
manner in which those issues must be tackled.25 Even where target health outcomes are 
identified, accountable care entities must still develop and meet standards and metrics for the 
improvement of population health that are attainable and sustainable over time.
DEVELOPING THE EVIDENCE BASE FOR ACCOUNTABLE CARE
Although opportunities to experiment with new health care delivery frameworks appear to 
be expanding under federal and state laws, to date there are little data to suggest that the 
accountable care mechanisms discussed previously will improve population health.1 
Because these laws require accountable care entities to both measure and meet designated 
benchmarks, the evidence collected on implementation may outpace the evidence collected 
on health outcomes for some time.1 In place of public health impact data, experts support the 
evaluation of process measures, including provider and payer readiness to adopt an 
accountable care framework and contract structures, implementation activities undertaken, 
and the intermediate outcomes achieved.1 For example, the Alternative Quality Contract 
performance measures in Massachusetts included primary care–oriented measures under the 
direct control of providers, including aggregate and individual measures in chronic care 
management, adult preventive care, and pediatric care.10
At the same time, experts have proposed new types of organizations that could benefit from 
qualifying as accountable care entities under existing laws. In addition to existing large 
group practices and integrated delivery systems in the private accountable care framework, 
physician–hospital organizations that function within a hospital’s medical staff, independent 
practice associations that have become organized networks of physician practices, and 
“virtual” physician organizations comprised of small, independent physician practices may 
all develop contracts to serve as accountable care entities.26 To evaluate these new types of 
mechanisms, providers and facilities will have to collect data not only on cost, quality, and 
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the population served, but also on electronic health record use, quality improvement and care 
management processes, and training programs.26
In addition to research on process measures, there are other opportunities to evaluate the 
long-term impacts of this framework, including health, cost, and behavioral outcomes. As 
with previous health system transformation research, evaluations may be designed to study 
health impacts on distinct populations: those covered under an accountable care contract, 
those cared for by the providers outside the contract, and the community as a whole.26 
Evaluations may also measure performance against quality and cost benchmarks for 
vulnerable populations, particularly those with complex medical problems or social 
disadvantages, to determine if Medicaid accountable care entities can serve their unique 
needs.27 Once decision-makers determine the metrics that will be used to measure 
population health measures for the accountable care framework, further research may show 
which accountable care mechanisms, if any, will be useful in improving public health.
CONCLUSIONS
Accountable care frameworks have emerged as one way for health care and public health 
providers and facilities to address health outcomes while maintaining cost and quality goals 
for the services provided. Private provider networks, including new types of practices and 
organizations, have established quality metrics from the innovations made over the course of 
the past decade that can track public health outcomes. Medicare ACOs could serve to 
support holistic patient care if providers and facilities are able to meet the cost and quality 
benchmarks designated. State accountable care strategies translate these principles to the 
care of the most vulnerable populations through Medicaid. Future research efforts designed 
to show effects on population health through these and other health care delivery systems 
that expand accountable care into public and private networks will require benchmarks that 
measure prevention, health care quality, and patient satisfaction. Ultimately, the evidence 
may support law-based interventions that achieve effective, sustainable health care delivery 
systems and improve public health through accountable care.
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